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Values and Assumptions of the Bush NLRB:
Trumping Workers' Rights
WILMA B. LIEBMAN t
Thank you very much for the invitation to be here
today. I'm really quite privileged to have been invited to
participate in this twenty-fifth anniversary retrospective of
James Atleson's Values and Assumptions in American
Labor Law. And I am especially privileged to be in the
company of such distinguished scholars, including my
former colleague, [former Chairman of the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB)] Bill Gould.
This conference provides an opportunity to reexamine
Professor Atleson's thesis through the lens of the Bush
NLRB. Some days it feels as if I have been on the Board for
a quarter of a century, so this event seems particularly fitting.
Professor Atleson wrote that pre-Wagner Act' values
and assumptions, especially notions of private property,
prerogatives of capital, and employee duties of loyalty and
deference, helped to explain many court decisions, "[W]hich
otherwise seemed odd, irrational or, at least, inconsistent
with received wisdom."' I think it is fair to say that these
same values and assumptions permeate the decisions of the
Bush NLRB.
Certainly the output of the Bush NLRB reflects no
shortage of decisions that are odd, irrational, or inconsistent
with the received wisdom, and sometimes all three things at
once. And these decisions reflect exactly the values and
assumptions that Professor Atleson has identified, sometimes
quite explicitly, suggesting, that the received wisdom, or the
values, of the Wagner Act had little hold on the Bush NLRB
t Member of the National Labor Relations Board. This is a transcript of
remarks delivered on September 19, 2008, during the symposium marking the
twenty-fifth anniversary of the publication of James B. Atleson's Values and
Assumptions in American Labor Law, presented by the University at Buffalo
Law School in conjunction with the Baldy Center for Law and Social Policy.
1. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
2. JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAw 10
(1983).
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at all. In fact, the Board was not reluctant to turn back the
clock.
At the same time, some of the cases of the Bush Board
reveal a persistent conflict of values between the Wagner
Act and other pieces of legislation. Early on, of course, we
saw the Supreme Court deal with the conflict between labor
law and maritime mutiny law, and, more recently, the 2002
Hoffman Plastic decision that dealt with the conflict
between labor law and immigration law. But recent Board
cases also highlight the tension between Wagner Act values
and assumptions and those of post-Wagner Act legislation
including the Taft-Hartley Act 3, and particularly its free
choice and free speech provisions, and also with the
individual rights legal regime that began in the 1960s.
The Board's recent cases also reveal a conflict between
Wagner Act values and assumptions and the values and
assumptions of so-called judicial conservatism. In short, I
would say that labor law has been trumped by whatever
happens to be in competition with it. This is what I call the
first rule of statutory interpretation: the National Labor
Relations Act always yields.
The immediate legacy of the Bush Board, of course, is
that we are today a two-person board, and have been since
January of this year [2008] when the Board went from five
to two members. With all likelihood this will be the
situation for the foreseeable future, until after a new
president is elected and gets around to filling these
vacancies. Had the Bush Board been more moderate in its
decisions, had the dissenting opinions been less vocal, we
likely would not be where we are today.
Critical to any understanding of the Board today is an
appreciation of the controversy within the Board and about
the Board during the Bush administration. The Board itself
has been sharply split in virtually every one of its major
decisions. The split has produced, in the form of dissenting
opinions, a clearly articulated alternative view of what labor
law should be, at least under the existing statute, and also a
view of how the Bush Board has failed to uphold the values
of the law. Surely fueled in part by the many dissenting
opinions, the Bush Board became very controversial. This
was demonstrated by a joint congressional hearing that was
3. 29 U.S.C. § 141 (2006).
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held last December by the House and Senate labor
committees, at which then-Chairman Battista and I were
asked to testify. We were on the witness stand for two
hours, and then a second panel of practitioners and one
academic were also questioned about the Bush Board
decisions, in particular focusing on what was called by
organized labor "The September Massacre" or the group of
cases at issue from September 2007. The controversy is also
revealed in the Senate gridlock over filling vacancies at the
Board, despite what is arguably a lack of a quorum.
The Bush Board has been very deeply divided, and the
divisions have been wide-ranging: what the law is, what it
should be, what policy choice should prevail. We've also
disagreed about judicial philosophy and legal methodology.
We have differed on virtually everything: burden of
proof, who has it, whether it's been met, what inferences are
to be drawn from the facts, credibility resolutions. We have
even differed over whether to grant extensions of time.
Let me start with the substantive differences, the
competing views of the statute, and competing policy
preferences. I think each of these divisions bears out
Professor Atleson's theory. As I said, recent major cases,
each with dissenting opinions, have marginalized statutory
rights. Decisions of the Clinton Board that made moderate
efforts to update the statute by dealing with statutory
coverage and a variety of issues were overruled by the Bush
Board. As I stated in testimony to Congress last December,
virtually every policy choice of the Bush era impeded
organizing, created obstacles to collective bargaining, or
favored employer interests over worker rights.
Now I recognize that even in the best of times, with a
Board that is willing to give a dynamic interpretation to the
law, there are significant constraints on the Board. We have
an aging statute; we deal with years of precedent; we
operate in a hostile economic, political and judicial climate.
So to some extent, no matter who is serving on the Board,
we may be operating only on the margins of this statute.
During the Clinton Board years, in a journal that Professor
Rabin edited, two union lawyers wrote that Board decisions
revealed a lack of consensus about the fundamental tenets
of labor policy, and the "increasingly confined (indeed,
20091 645
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relatively insignificant) doctrinal terrain on which the
conflict over U.S. labor policy is enacted."4
So, even in the best of times, we operate somewhat on
the margins. Nonetheless, the Bush Board has made things
worse. While any one of its decisions alone may not be
cataclysmic in impact, when viewed together they certainly
show a pattern of weakening the protections of the Act.
Let me outline what I am talking about. First of all,
fewer workers have been afforded fewer rights. The Board
has made it harder for contingent workers to organize,
refusing to look at the changes in the nature of the
employment relationship which today emphasize flexibility
over the stability that was assumed when the statute was
written. The Board has put new groups of workers, such as
university graduate teaching assistants, outside the
coverage of the law altogether, even if they meet the
common law definition of employee. In doing that, the Board
has ignored the changing economic realities of universities
that make collective bargaining appropriate. The Board has
held fast to rigid legal categories, rather than consider the
real dependency on employers of many so-called
independent contractors, who can and should be treated as
statutory employees.
A decision that probably best captures what the Bush
Board did is the Oakwood decision, which dealt with the
definition of a supervisor under the Act 5. The Board adopted
a much broader definition of the statutory supervisory
exclusion than it had to, by looking to dictionary definitions,
in fact three different definitions. When the dissent pointed
out that the decision could potentially exclude millions of
people from the coverage of the law, the majority said that
looking at the potential consequences was result-oriented.
At the same time, the Board has narrowed the scope of
what is considered protected, concerted activity for mutual
aid and protection under Section 7 of the Act, and it has cut
back on the remedies available for workers whose narrowed
rights are violated. The decisions of the Bush Board
signaled that the right to join together to improve working
4. Jonathan P. Hiatt & Craig Becker, Drift and Division on the Clinton
NLRB, 16 LAB. LAw. 103 (2000).
5. Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. 37 (2006).
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conditions, particularly in a non-union setting, may be
purely illusory.
In case after case, the Board has found that employees'
statutory rights must yield to countervailing business
interests of all sorts, including private property rights, such
as an employer's abstract property interest in a piece of
scrap paper which is used to post a union meeting notice.
Employee rights must yield to various managerial
prerogatives and business justifications, for example,
business justifications that were not even asserted by the
employer for engaging in partial lockouts. Employee rights
have been held to yield to notions of workplace decorum,
and to employer free speech rights. There's clearly been a
more laissez faire approach to regulating employer
campaign activity, so that intimidating statements against
unionization are typically seen as lawful expressions of free
speech, rather than unlawful threats or coercion of
employees exercising their right to engage in union
activities without interference. On the other hand, where
employees make statements, or engage in conduct, that is
considered to exceed the rules of civility or decorum, those
employees have been held to lose the protections of the Act.
Notable, in this analysis, is the Board's decision in the
Register Guard case. 6 There the Board decided that an
employer's e-mail system is a piece of property, just like a
telephone or a bulletin board, and thus employers may
completely prohibit their employees from using the e-mail
system to communicate with each other about working
conditions, even if they use the e-mail system for
communicating with each other about business matters.
This case I sometimes subtitle "The Act is Surely Dead," if
the majority could not find a way to accommodate
employees' rights to communicate with each other at the
workplace through this new technology.
The Bush Board decisions have also revealed a laissez
faire approach to bargaining, giving employers free rein to
operate and make operational changes without the duty to
engage in any kind of meaningful bargaining.
For the first time-and this is perhaps one of the more
dramatic things that the Bush Board did-the Board
explicitly stated that the freedom of choice guaranteed in
6. Guard Publ'g Co., 351 N.L.R.B. 70 (2007).
2009] 647
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Section 7 of the Act (which is to say, in this case, the right to
refrain from union activities) prevails in the statutory
scheme over the policy to promote collective bargaining. The
majority reasoned that the right to refrain is explicit in
Section 7, but the policy to promote collective bargaining is
just a general policy statement. To my knowledge this is the
first time the Board has ever said that. (The only other
place I found it was in a dissenting opinion by Chairman
Dotson in the mid 1980s.) In so doing, the Board has
presented its own dramatic policy decision as a simple
matter of statutory interpretation. The majority's take on
the relative strength of these statutory policies represents a
break with tradition from the Board's past expression of
statutory values. Indeed, the Chairman justified these
decisions by saying that Taft-Hartley, a subsequent
enactment, mandated this interpretation; that after Taft-
Hartley, collective bargaining is no longer the essential
policy of the Act. Historically, however, the Board has
balanced these competing policies: the general policy to
promote collective bargaining and the right to refrain.
But now, it seems, collective bargaining has receded as
a national policy goal, and the right to refrain has assumed
center stage. In turn, employee free choice has increasingly
been construed to minimize the choice of employees who
have selected union representation, and employers have
been given greater freedom to vindicate their employees'
choice by withdrawing recognition from unions. At the same
time, the Board has erected obstacles for employers and
unions who wish to enter into voluntary recognition
agreements. In short, labor law has been turned inside out,
limiting principles have been made the central focus of the
Act, and the central policies have been turned aside.
The statutory goal of encouraging collective bargaining
is now superseded by competing legal norms. To some
extent, the Board is now following what the courts have
done, leaning more heavily toward an individual rights
focus, the norms of individual rights legislation, and giving
greater precedence to the individual right to refrain.
Some might argue that what the Board has done is
simply part of a larger legal trend. I think, however, that,
taken together, what all these decisions suggest is an
underlying discomfort with the concept of government
regulation of business, particularly in the labor law arena,
and a discomfort with the notion of collective action and the
zeal that may accompany those efforts. These are, however,
[Vol. 57648
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the fundamental premises of this statute and so, in
revealing this discomfort, it appears that the Board is
uncomfortable with the role that it is supposed to play.
Besides our substantive differences, the Board has also
been deeply divided over questions of judicial philosophy
and legal methodology, how to approach the law and our
cases. The Bush Board majority has invoked the doctrine ofjudicial conservatism to apply the statute strictly, to be
unwilling to consider legislative history and other sources
and instead looking to the dictionary. By engaging in a
sterile debate over the meaning of words, they are surely
guaranteeing the ossification of this statute. Their
philosophy parallels what Justice Scalia said in the
Kentucky River decision a few years ago, where he was
examining the Board's interpretation of the supervisory
exclusion. 7 Justice Scalia said the Board's policy goals were
fine: to include as many people under the coverage of the
Act as possible. But, he said, the problem is you can't get
there through this statutory text.
The Board has also adopted a static approach to the
law. It has been unwilling to adapt the law's doctrines to
vastly changing social and economic conditions: the
changing nature of the employment relationship, the
changing nature of work, and the organization of work,
shifting firm boundaries, vertical dis-integration of firms,
and the general volatility of the business world. The
decisions are formalistic without any real-world bearing.
The Board during this period has moved backward, not
forward, and not just by reversing Clinton era decisions. It
has moved backward by failing to keep pace with the rapid
changes in the nature of work and in the workplace. It has
missed chance after chance to reinvigorate labor law for the
twenty-first century.
I have argued that this philosophy of judicial conservatism,
at an administrative agency in particular, is an abdication
of responsibility. Administrative agencies are supposed to
adapt their rules and doctrines in light of changed
circumstance and in light of experience. What judicial
conservatism does is to shift the focus from practical and
policy considerations-what's going on in the workplace and
7. NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706 (2001).
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the economy, how do people really behave and why-to
abstract legal reasoning, parsing doctrines, poring over the
dictionary. Judicial conservatism in this context is really a
form of agency radicalism. Judicial conservatism, therefore,
becomes another value that is at odds with received
wisdom.
I think the best way to interpret this law, as a matter of
judicial philosophy, was well stated by Louis Brandeis, who
in 1916 gave a speech titled "The Living Law." He lamented
the failure of the law at that time, at the beginning of the
twentieth century, to evolve with the economy and the
society. He said that legal science was static and what
courts needed to recognize was that "no law, written or
unwritten, can be understood without a full knowledge of
the facts out of which it arises and to which it is to be
applied."8 That principle, he said, applied, in particular, to
the law of the workplace, and he cited the inequality of
position between employer and employee. He pointed out
that "the group relation of employee to employer with
collective bargaining . . . was essential to the workers'
protection."9 The struggle, in his view, was for "a living
law."
Brandeis' critique of stasis and formalism in the law
remains current as it applies to labor law, certainly over the
last few years. The record of the Bush Board compounds the
fact that this Act is more than seventy years old, a product
of the industrial era, and it has not been significantly
amended in sixty years, since the end of the Second World
War. Labor law scholars talk about the law in terms of
death or dying. Probably the kindest expression is
"ossification." And the result of this has been a profound
loss of confidence in the law, the Board itself, and in its
decision making-not simply in terms of the results that
have been reached, but in the way those results have been
reached. It is more than just a change in law or discontent
with the outcome of a particular case. The evidence is that
our caseload is in steep decline, particularly in the
representation case area. Organized labor is avoiding the
Board at any cost. There has been a sharp move to negotiate
recognition, rather than use the Board's election machinery.
And in an historic twist, organized labor is looking more
8. Louis D. Brandeis, The Living Law, 10 ILL. L. REV. 461, 467 (1916).
9. Id. at 463.
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and more to the states as a guarantor of important rights,
rather than to the federal government.
At this point, I think that I should stop and let Virginia
[Seitz] proceed with her comments. In short, what I would
say in conclusion is that the Wagner Act was a twentieth
century law. What we need is a twenty-first century law.
What we got was really a nineteenth century law.
I thank you.

